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Beyond Cheneyism and Snowdenism 
Cass R. Sunstein† 
In the domain of national security, many people favor some kind of precau-
tionary principle, insisting that it is far better to be safe than sorry and contending 
that a range of important safeguards, including widespread surveillance, is amply 
justified to prevent the loss of life. Those who object to the resulting initiatives, and 
in particular to widespread surveillance, respond with a precautionary principle of 
their own, seeking safeguards against what they see as unacceptable risks to priva-
cy and liberty. The problem is that, as in the environmental context, a precaution-
ary principle threatens to create an unduly narrow viewscreen, focusing people on 
a mere subset of the risks at stake. What is needed is a principle of risk manage-
ment, typically based on some form of cost-benefit balancing. For some problems in 
the area of national security, however, it is difficult to specify either costs or bene-
fits, creating a severe epistemic difficulty. Considerable progress can nonetheless be 
made with the assistance of four ideas, calling for (1) break-even analysis; (2) the 
avoidance of gratuitous costs (economic or otherwise); (3) a prohibition on the invo-
cation or use of illicit grounds (such as punishment of free speech or prying into 
people’s private lives); and (4) maximin, which counsels in favor of eliminating or 
reducing the risk of the very worst of the worst-case scenarios. In the face of in-
commensurable goods, however, the idea of maximin faces particular challenges. 
I.  TWO TARGETS AND A THESIS 
Consider two views: 
1. The world has become an unprecedentedly dangerous 
place. Terrorist threats are omnipresent. As the 9/11 at-
tacks display, numerous people are prepared to engage in 
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terrorism, and they sometimes succeed. In particular, they 
want to kill Americans. The first obligation of public offi-
cials is to keep the citizenry safe. To do that, the best meth-
ods may well involve widespread surveillance, both domes-
tically and abroad. If the result is saved lives, surveillance 
is worth it. Even when the probability of harm is low, and 
even if the government is operating in the midst of grave 
uncertainty, it is appropriate to do whatever must be done, 
and whatever technology allows, to prevent deaths and to 
protect the nation, even or perhaps especially from worst-
case scenarios. 
2. Americans face unprecedented threats from their own 
government. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United 
States has seen the rise of a massive and (at least until re-
cently) mostly secret security apparatus involving the col-
lection of a vast quantity of data about the communications 
of ordinary people. Personal privacy is now at serious risk, 
and the same is true for free speech. “Trust us” is never an 
adequate response to citizens’ legitimate concerns. We need 
to create aggressive safeguards to protect civil liberties—not 
only now but also for periods in which the government is in 
especially bad hands—and to create precautions against the 
evident dangers, including worst-case scenarios. 
For vividness and ease of exposition, and without ascribing 
particular views to any particular person, we can describe the 
first position as “Cheneyism,” in honor of former Vice President 
Dick Cheney. Consider Cheney’s suggestion: 
[S]ooner or later, there’s going to be another attack and 
they’ll have deadlier weapons than ever before, [and] we’ve 
got to consider the possibility of a nuclear device or biologi-
cal agent. . . . And when you consider somebody smuggling a 
nuclear device into the United States, it becomes very im-
portant to gather intelligence on your enemies and stop that 
attack before it ever gets launched.1 
There is a catastrophic worst-case scenario here, in the form of a 
nuclear device in the hands of terrorists in the United States. 
Also for vividness and ease of exposition, and again with-
out ascribing particular views to any particular person, we can 
 
 1 Chris Wallace, Former Vice President Dick Cheney Talks NSA Surveillance Pro-
gram (Fox News, June 16, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/FTS9-LNX4. 
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describe the second position as “Snowdenism,” in honor of for-
mer NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Consider Snowden’s 
suggestion: 
If we want to live in open and liberal societies, we need to 
have safe spaces where we can experiment with new 
thoughts, new ideas, and [where] we can discover what it is 
we really think and what we really believe in without being 
judged. If we can’t have the privacy of our bedrooms, if we 
can’t have the privacy of our notes on our computer, if we 
can’t have the privacy of our electronic diaries, we can’t 
have privacy at all.2 
There is a catastrophic worst-case scenario here, in the form of a 
situation in which “we can’t have privacy at all.”3 
Both Cheneyism and Snowdenism reflect enthusiasm for 
aggressive precautions against risks, though they display radi-
cally different perspectives on what we have to fear most. My 
principal goal in this Essay is to reject these two approaches and 
to link them with a standard, but unhelpful, approach to risks in 
general.4 I sketch a behavioral perspective on why that unhelp-
ful approach has such widespread appeal, perhaps especially in 
the domain of national security. I suggest that to avoid narrow 
viewscreens (understood as the limited set of risks to which the 
analyst attends), a far better approach focuses more broadly on 
risk management, with a particular focus on cost-benefit analy-
sis. One of the many advantages of cost-benefit analysis is that 
it reduces (without eliminating) the twin dangers of selective at-
tention and motivated reasoning. 
In the face of high levels of uncertainty, however, that ap-
proach faces especially serious challenges, above all because we 
may not know enough to specify either its costs or its benefits. I 
suggest that it is possible to respond to that uncertainty with 
four ideas: break-even analysis; the avoidance of gratuitous 
costs (economic or otherwise); a prohibition on the invocation of 
certain illicit grounds; and maximin, which requires attention to 
the worst of the worst-case scenarios. I explore how these ideas 
might help us move beyond Cheneyism and Snowdenism. 
 
 2  Alan Rusbridger and Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden Interview - the Edited 
Transcript (The Guardian, July 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4N7W-AM8M. 
 3 Id.  
 4 For a discussion and critique of this approach in broad terms, see generally Cass 
R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge 2005). I draw 
on that discussion here. 
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II.  AN UNHELPFUL PRINCIPLE 
A. Precautions and Paralysis 
In environmental policy, many people accept the precau-
tionary principle.5 The idea takes diverse forms, but its central 
notion is that regulators should take aggressive action to avoid 
environmental risks, even if the likelihood of harm is very low.6 
Suppose, for example, that there is some probability, even a 
small one, that the genetic modification of food will produce se-
rious environmental harm. For those who embrace the precau-
tionary principle, it is important to take precautions against po-
tentially serious hazards, simply because it is better to be safe 
than sorry. Especially if the worst-case scenario is very bad, 
strong precautions are entirely appropriate. Compare the medi-
cal context, in which it is tempting and often sensible to say that 
even if there is only a small probability that a patient is facing a 
serious health risk, doctors should take precautions to ensure 
that those risks do not come to fruition. 
In an illuminating account, the precautionary principle is 
understood as holding that 
if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe 
harm to the public domain (such as general health or the 
environment), and in the absence of scientific near-certainty 
about the safety of the action, the burden of proof about ab-
sence of harm falls on those proposing the action.7 
 
 5 For a general discussion of the precautionary principle in environmental policy, 
see id at 64–76; Kerry H. Whiteside, Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in 
Confronting Environmental Risk 61–87 (MIT 2006) (comparing the use of the precau-
tionary principle in environmental policy in the United States and Europe). For an espe-
cially interesting discussion, see generally Nassim Nicholas Taleb, et al, The Precaution-
ary Principle (with Application to the Genetic Modification of Organisms) (NYU School of 
Engineering Working Paper Series, Sept 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SJY5 
-QDF5 (examining the precautionary principle in the context of genetic modification and 
the accompanying potential risks). 
 6 See Whiteside, Precautionary Politics at viii (cited in note 5) (explaining the tra-
ditional applications of the precautionary principle in the context of avoiding environ-
mental disasters). 
 7 Taleb, et al, The Precautionary Principle at *1 (cited in note 5). Note that Profes-
sor Nassim Taleb and his coauthors defend the precautionary principle “only in extreme 
situations: when the potential harm is systemic (rather than localized) and the conse-
quences can involve total irreversible ruin, such as the extinction of human beings or all 
life on the planet.” Id. 
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The Wingspread Declaration,8 the result of a conference on the 
precautionary principle, puts it more cautiously: “When an activ-
ity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In 
this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, 
should bear the burden of proof.”9 
The precautionary principle has received prominent atten-
tion in other contexts as well. The influential 1992 Rio Declara-
tion10 states, also with relative caution, that when “there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”11 In 
Europe, the precautionary principle has sometimes been under-
stood in a still-stronger way, suggesting that it is important to 
build “a margin of safety into all decision making.”12 This stronger 
version, associated with both Cheneyism and Snowdenism, is 
what I explore here, in the form of a suggestion that when an ac-
tivity, product, or situation might create risks, it is appropriate 
to take precautions against those risks even if the probability of 
harm is very low.13 
In the abstract, these ideas have evident appeal. A clear 
demonstration of imminent or eventual harm is hardly neces-
sary to justify precautions, not least against the risk of terror-
ism. But there is a serious, even devastating problem with the 
 
 8 Wingspread Consensus Statement on the Precautionary Principle (Science & En-
vironmental Health Network, Jan 26, 1998), archived at http://perma.cc/J592-WZ9A. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Environment Pro-
gramme, June 1992), archived at http://perma.cc/R8Y4-W7XB. 
 11 Bjørn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the 
World 348 (Cambridge 2001). 
 12 Id at 349. 
 13 For a valuable and subtle discussion of the precautionary principle, see Daniel 
Steel, Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle: Science, Evidence, and Environmental 
Policy 44–68 (Cambridge 2015) (examining whether there is such a thing as “the precau-
tionary principle”). For an instructive challenge to my arguments here, at least in the con-
text of genetically modified organisms, see Taleb, et al, The Precautionary Principle at *8–
11 (cited in note 5). Of course, we could imagine varieties of Cheneyism and Snowdenism 
that take many different forms. They might, for example, suggest that the danger is real 
and present rather than conjectural or probabilistic. Even in those forms, however, the 
analysis here is essentially unaffected. As the interest in national security or in privacy 
protection begins to focus on the full range of variables at stake—including expected out-
comes and probabilities—it begins to converge on the risk management approach that I 
endorse. 
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precautionary principle, at least in its crudest forms:14 risks are 
on all sides of social situations, and efforts to reduce risks can 
themselves create risks. For this reason, the precautionary prin-
ciple forbids the very steps that it requires. If a nation takes ag-
gressive steps against the genetic modification of food, it might 
deprive people, including poor people, of food that is low in cost 
and high in nutrition. Precautions themselves can create “a risk 
of significant health or environmental damage to others or to fu-
ture generations.”15  
It follows that the very steps commanded by the precaution-
ary principle violate the precautionary principle.16 The point is 
that few precautions lack downside risks, however speculative or 
remote, and if we are concerned enough to build a margin of 
safety into all decisions, any such margins must apply to precau-
tions, too. Worst-case thinking can be quite dangerous. 
For this reason, the precautionary principle turns out to be 
incoherent or even paralyzing, because it forbids the very 
measures that it requires. None of this means, of course, that 
nations should not be concerned about the genetic modification 
of food, or that they should demand a certainty of harm—or even 
a probability of harm—before undertaking regulation. If an ac-
tivity creates a 1 percent risk (or less) of producing catastrophic 
environmental damage, then it is worthwhile to expend signifi-
cant resources to eliminate that risk, even if our focus is only on 
expected value. People buy insurance against low-probability 
harms, and sensibly so. But reasonable regulators must consider 
both sides of the equation. Acknowledging the potential difficul-
ty of valuation, they must engage in some form of risk manage-
ment, and consider whether the costs of precautions are worth 
the benefits.17 
 
 14 There are many refinements of the precautionary principle. See, for example, 
Taleb, et al, The Precautionary Principle at *3–5 (cited in note 5); Steel, Philosophy and 
the Precautionary Principle at 9–16 (cited in note 13). 
 15 Sunstein, Laws of Fear at 19 (cited in note 4), quoting Cloning, 2002: Hearings 
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 107th 
Cong, 2d Sess 19 (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President of Friends of the 
Earth). 
 16 For an interesting refinement and counterargument in the case of genetic modi-
fication, focused on the risk of truly catastrophic harm, see Taleb, et al, The Precaution-
ary Principle at *1 (cited in note 5). Even if Taleb and his coauthors’ argument is taken 
as convincing, it is explicitly limited to unusual contexts and hence does not bear on the 
general points made in this Essay. See id. 
 17 In this Essay, I am largely bracketing the question of how to specify costs and 
benefits, as well as questions about distribution and equity. For a superb discussion of 
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B. The Appeal of Precautions 
These points raise a genuine puzzle: Why do reasonable 
people accept forms of the precautionary principle that do not 
make much sense? The answers bear directly on environmental 
policy, but as we shall see, they help to account for the appeal of 
Cheneyism and Snowdenism as well. The most general point is 
that the precautionary principle seems appealing and workable 
because (and when) people use narrow viewscreens, focusing on 
a subset of the risks at stake rather than the whole. (There are 
close analogues in the domain of investor behavior.)18 
Narrow viewscreens can also produce motivated reasoning. 
Suppose that we are focused above all on the risks associated 
with terrorism. If so, we might be motivated to discount and 
treat as trivial the privacy and liberty risks said to be associated 
with certain measures that are designed to reduce the risks of 
terrorism. Or suppose that we are focused above all on privacy 
and liberty. If so, we might be motivated to discount and treat as 
trivial the risks said to be associated with certain measures that 
are designed to protect against risks to privacy and liberty. In 
my view, both forms of motivated reasoning have been playing a 
significant role in this domain. 
Three more particular factors seem especially important. 
The first is the availability heuristic. A risk that is familiar, like 
the risk associated with nuclear power, will be seen as more se-
rious than a risk that is less familiar, like the risk associated 
with heat during the summer.19 So too will recent events have a 
greater impact than earlier ones. This point helps explain much 
risk-related behavior, including decisions to take or urge precau-
tions. In the words of Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, “[A] class whose instances are easily retrieved will 
appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose 
instances are less retrievable.”20 
 
these topics, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (Oxford 2012). 
 18 See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 
Loyola U Chi L J 173, 191–95 (2013) (identifying similarities between environmental 
and financial systems). 
 19 See Eric Klinenberg, Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago 10 (Chicago 
2002) (comparing the death toll of the 1995 Chicago heat wave to that of other, better-
known disasters). 
 20 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974). 
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The central point is that for those who embrace the precau-
tionary principle, some risks are cognitively available and others 
are not. Because the focus is on the former, the principle seems 
far more coherent than it is. Suppose, for example, that the pre-
cautionary principle has appeal in the context of nuclear power. 
The appeal might have a great deal to do with highly salient in-
cidents in which the risks associated with nuclear power came to 
fruition, or close to it––as in the cases of Three Mile Island and 
Fukushima.21 Or suppose that the principle seems to suggest the 
importance of a new initiative to reduce the risk of train acci-
dents. It would not be surprising if those who were motivated by 
the principle were alert to a recent train accident, which would 
appear to justify precautions. 
The second factor involves loss aversion.22 Behavioral scien-
tists have emphasized that people much dislike losses from the 
status quo.23 In fact, they dislike losses about twice as much as 
they like corresponding gains. 24 The precautionary principle 
often seems coherent only because losses (or particular kinds of 
losses) are salient, while forgone gains (or other kinds of losses) 
are not. In the context of genetically modified food, for example, 
the environmental risks seem to many to be salient and “on 
screen” because they are self-evident losses, while the various 
costs of regulation might not be seen this way because they pre-
vent potential gains.25 And in the context of privacy, loss aver-
sion can be especially important, as people strongly resist a loss 
of the privacy that they have come to expect.26 (The idea of “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy” may, in fact, encode some form of 
loss aversion.) 
 
 21  See John P. Christodouleas, et al, Short-Term and Long-Term Health Risks of 
Nuclear-Power-Plant Accidents, 364 New Eng J Med 2334, 2334–35 (2011) (comparing 
three major nuclear accidents and their consequences). 
 22 See Eyal Zamir, Law, Psychology, and Morality: The Role of Loss Aversion 119–
65 (Oxford 2015) (explaining the theory of loss aversion and the implications of this phe-
nomenon in the context of law). 
 23 See id at 4–5.  
 24 Id at 6 (“Tversky and Kahneman estimated that monetary losses loom larger 
than gains by a factor of 2.25.”). 
 25 For a discussion of the importance of what is “on screen” and what is not, see 
Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Envi-
ronmental Issues 76–77 (Chicago 1996).  
 26 See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John, and George Loewenstein, What Is Pri-
vacy Worth?, 42 J Legal Stud 249, 255 (2013) (describing the loss-aversion heuristic as 
the most supported explanation of a gap in privacy valuation). 
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The third factor, and perhaps the most important, involves 
probability neglect.27 The largest point is that if a bad outcome is 
emotionally gripping, people might well be inclined to eliminate 
it even if it has a low probability of coming to fruition.28 The emo-
tionally gripping outcome crowds out an assessment of the ques-
tion of probability. And in fact, both Cheneyism and Snowdenism 
seem to derive a significant amount of their attraction from 
probability neglect. Suppose that you are asked how much you 
would pay to eliminate a small risk of a gruesome death from 
cancer, of a terrorist attack, or of a small child’s death. You 
might well focus on the tragic outcome and not so much on the 
question of probability. A great deal of evidence confirms the 
phenomenon of probability neglect.29 The precautionary principle 
often has appeal, and seems sensible, because some subset of 
risks appears emotionally gripping and the bad outcomes asso-
ciated with those risks serve to crowd out other considerations. 
Consider, in this regard, the finding that when people are 
asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for losses re-
sulting from terrorism, they will pay more than if they are asked 
how much they will pay for flight insurance from all causes.30 
The evident explanation for this peculiar result, fitting with a 
form of Cheneyism, is that the word “terrorism” evokes vivid 
images of disaster, thus crowding out probability judgments. 
Note also that when people discuss a low-probability risk, their 
concerns rise even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently 
trustworthy assurances that the likelihood of harm really is in-
finitesimal.31 With these points in mind, both the appeal and the 
apparent administrability of the precautionary principle should 
be clear. The principle seems to work, and to be attractive, be-
cause of identifiable features of human cognition. 
 
 27 See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 
Yale L J 61, 62–63 (2002).  
 28 See id at 62 (providing examples in which people seek to avoid a negative out-
come, even if the probability of its occurrence is very low). 
 29 See id at 64–68 (summarizing a number of studies documenting the cognitive 
biases related to probability neglect). 
 30 See Eric J. Johnson, et al, Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Deci-
sions, 7 J Risk & Uncertainty 35, 39 (1993). 
 31 See, for example, James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, The Nevada Initia-
tive: A Risk Communication Fiasco, 13 Risk Analysis 497, 498–99 (1993) (describing the 
impact of a “counterproductive” advertising campaign that emphasized the safety of a nu-
clear waste repository site but changed almost nothing regarding the public’s opposition). 
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III.  PRECAUTIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
A. Cheneyism 
Some people embrace a version of the precautionary principle 
that no one rejects—one that grows out of the self-evidently cor-
rect claim that it is exceedingly important to counteract serious 
threats to the nation, including terrorist attacks.32 Vice President 
Cheney himself offered the core of the principle:  
We have to deal with this new type of threat in a way we 
haven’t yet defined . . . [w]ith a low-probability, high-impact 
event like this.  
. . . 
If there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are 
helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we 
have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.33 
In terms of standard decision theory, of course, it seems prepos-
terous to treat a 1 percent risk the same way that one would 
treat a certainty. People should not, and ordinarily do not, live 
their lives that way. But as the stakes grow higher, the expected 
cost of a 1 percent risk becomes higher as well, and a precau-
tionary approach to a 1 percent risk of catastrophe has a great 
deal of appeal. 
For the purposes of illustration, let us focus on the question 
of surveillance. Even if some kinds of surveillance sweep up an 
immense amount of material, including much that has no interest 
from the standpoint of national security, some people think: 
surely it is better to be safe than sorry. It is tempting to empha-
size the great difficulty of ruling out the possibility that, if the 
intelligence community obtains as much information as technol-
ogy permits, it will find some information that is ultimately 
helpful for national-security purposes. “Helpful” here is not mere 
abstraction; it may mean “saves lives” or “prevents catastro-
phes.” Perhaps surveillance could prevent another 9/11; perhaps 
some forms of surveillance have not proved indispensable in 
the recent past but could prove indispensable in the future. A 
 
 32 See, for example, Genevieve Lennon, Precautionary Tales: Suspicionless Counter-
Terrorism Stop and Search, 15 Crimin & Crim Just 44, 46–51 (2015) (describing the use 
of the precautionary principle in the context of “suspicionless counter-terrorism stop and 
search” programs in the United Kingdom). 
 33 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America’s Pursuit of Its En-
emies since 9/11 61–62 (Simon & Schuster 2006). 
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precautionary measure in ordinary life—say, the purchase of 
safety equipment for a car—is not valueless just because it has 
not proved necessary over the initial years of ownership. The 
measure might well be worthwhile if it avoids just one incident 
at some time during the life of the vehicle. 
This claim could be elaborated in different ways, emphasiz-
ing diverse consequences from a successful terrorist attack. 
Whenever such an attack occurs, it has a series of proliferating 
costs, economic and otherwise. And if a future attack occurs, it 
might well lead to a demand for further restrictions on civil lib-
erties, meaning that aggressive steps that are designed to pro-
tect against attacks—and that are, in the eyes of some, objec-
tionable from the standpoint of civil liberties—might ultimately 
be justified or even necessary as a means of protecting civil liber-
ties. With these points in view, it seems plausible to argue that, 
at least in the context of national security, a precautionary prin-
ciple makes a great deal of sense. 
In light of that point, it is similarly tempting to think: if we 
can obtain information, we should obtain information. This 
thought is especially tempting to those whose mission is to pro-
tect the nation from harm. If your job is to reduce the risk of ter-
rorist attacks—and if you will be responsible, at least in part, for 
any such attacks if they occur—you might well want every 
available tool to increase the likelihood that no attacks will oc-
cur on your watch. That attitude might even seem indispensable 
to the successful performance of your most important task. 
Here as elsewhere, however, the problem is that multiple 
risks are involved. The point may be simplest to see when the 
question involves standard warmaking. Any effort to use mili-
tary force will create obvious risks, including risks to life and limb. 
What is required is a balance of risks, including probabilistic ones, 
rather than an abstract invocation of the idea of precaution. 
The same point holds true for widespread surveillance, 
which creates multiple risks of its own.34 Of these, perhaps the 
most obvious risks involve personal privacy. If the government 
holds a great deal of information, there is at least a risk of 
abuse—perhaps now or soon, but if not, then potentially in the 
future. We could imagine a range of possible fears and threats. 
 
 34 For a discussion of the risks of widespread surveillance, see Liberty and Security 
in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies *46–49 (Dec 12, 2013) (“Review Group 
Report”), archived at http://perma.cc/FG3M-QE8K. 
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Perhaps it is the mere fact of collection that is objectionable. 
Perhaps public officials are learning, or would learn, about in-
teractions or relationships for which people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Perhaps people could be threatened or 
punished for their political commitments or their religion. Per-
haps their conversations or relevant metadata could be released 
to the public, thus endangering domains that are or have be-
come central to private life. Perhaps officials will see such con-
versations or such metadata, thus producing a degree of intru-
sion into the private domain. 
There is also a risk to civil liberties, including the freedom 
of speech; if the government acquires metadata, there might 
well be (or perhaps there now is) a chilling effect on free discus-
sion, on journalists, and on journalists’ sources. Extensive forms 
of surveillance also create risks to commercial and economic in-
terests and to relationships with foreign nations. 
Each of these risks could be elaborated in great detail. For 
now, we need not undertake the relevant elaboration; the under-
lying risks have received a great deal of attention and have 
helped animate not merely proposals for reform35 but also signif-
icant legislative changes.36 The central point is that a form of 
Cheneyism, focused reasonably but solely on risks associated 
with terrorism, artificially truncates an appropriately wide 
viewscreen.37 
B. Snowdenism 
Focusing on an important subset of risks, some people em-
brace a privacy precautionary principle. In their view, the risk to 
personal privacy requires political reforms that reduce the risk 
that an incompetent or ill-motivated government might, now or 
at some future time, jeopardize personal privacy.38 In one form, 
associated with Snowdenism, the objection is that some inva-
sions of privacy have already occurred and are unacceptable in a 
 
 35 See generally, for example, id. 
 36 See Tribune Wire Reports, Obama Signs Bill Remaking NSA Phone Records 
Program (Chi Trib, June 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UM4C-RZSE. 
 37 It is true, of course, that one might endorse policies that are designed above all to 
reduce the risks of terrorism and that give little attention to privacy, civil liberties, and 
related values—not because of a limited viewscreen, but on the theory that a sensible 
approach to risk management, taking full account of the relevant values, justifies those 
policies. The discussion below is meant to address this conclusion. 
 38 See, for example, Giovanna De Minico, Privacy-Security: A Precautionary Princi-
ple Is Needed (EurActiv, Jan 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/97CL-STAE. 
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free society.39 In another form, also associated with Snowdenism, 
the claim is that more egregious invasions are possible or likely 
if corrective steps are not taken.40 
An evident source of the privacy precautionary principle is 
the availability heuristic: to some people, certain highly publi-
cized cases of abuse, at some point in the past, are very salient, 
not least in the United States and Europe, and they make the 
risk of future abuse seem far from speculative. Another under-
pinning is loss aversion: people are used to certain safeguards 
against invasions into what they see as their private domain, and 
widespread surveillance threatens to impose significant losses to 
core interests in freedom, dignity, and civic respect. A final un-
derpinning is probability neglect. It is easy to imagine (and in the 
view of some, to identify) privacy violations of an extreme or in-
tolerable sort;41 because those violations call up strong emotions, 
the very possibility that they will occur in the future stirs strong 
emotions. 
At the same time, and to return to my general theme, a pri-
vacy precautionary principle, taken by itself and for all that it is 
worth, would not make a great deal of sense, if only because it 
would give rise to national-security risks—and potentially seri-
ous ones at that. The problem is that if our only or central goal 
were to eliminate any and all risks to privacy, we would aban-
don forms of surveillance that might turn out to save lives. Safe-
guards for privacy are of course exceedingly important, but at 
the conceptual level, the question remains: Why should a nation 
adopt a form of precautionary thinking in the context of privacy 
while repudiating it in the context of national security? 
This question suggests that the relevant inquiries are best 
understood as involving a form of risk management. Here as 
elsewhere, risks of many kinds are on both sides of the ledger, 
and the task is to manage the full set, not to focus on one or a 
few. But the concept of risk management remains to be specified, 
 
 39 See, for example, Shami Chakrabarti, Let Me Be Clear – Edward Snowden Is a 
Hero (The Guardian, June 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X6JL-Z4L7 (“For years, 
UK and US governments broke the law. . . . [S]urely we can have an open and balanced 
discussion about how we adapt to new threats while safeguarding the intimacy and dig-
nity rightly craved by human beings.”). 
 40 See, for example, John Cassidy, Why Edward Snowden Is a Hero (New Yorker, 
June 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4YGH-Q3X7. 
 41 See Review Group Report at *75 (cited in note 34) (noting that “although recent 
disclosures and commentary have created the impression in some quarters that NSA 
surveillance is indiscriminate and pervasive across the globe, that is not the case”). 
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and in the context of national security, the effort at specification 
creates serious challenges. Call this the epistemic difficulty; it 
produces formidable problems for sensible risk management in 
this context. 
IV.  EXPECTED VALUES AND WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 
A. The Epistemic Difficulty, Contextualized 
Ideally, of course, we would be able to identify a range of 
possible outcomes, assign probabilities to each, and come up 
with some kind of common metric by which to make sensible 
comparisons. In regulatory policy in general, there is now a 
broad consensus in favor of cost-benefit analysis, understood as 
an effort to assess the costs and benefits of various options and 
to weigh the two against each other.42 Suppose, for example, that 
the monetized costs of an airline safety regulation are $400 mil-
lion and that the monetized benefits are $70 million. If so, the 
regulation is unlikely to proceed, at least unless the law requires 
it or unless nonquantifiable benefits can be invoked to tip the 
balance.43 
One of the hardest challenges for cost-benefit analysis, of 
course, is that many of the variables at stake can be difficult or 
perhaps even impossible to monetize, thus producing one kind of 
epistemic difficulty.44 In some of the most challenging cases, we 
might not be able to specify the relevant quantities even before 
we turn them into monetary equivalents. It might be unclear 
whether an air pollution regulation will save five hundred lives, 
or a thousand lives, or two thousand lives, or three thousand 
lives. If the value of a statistical life is $9 million,45 then the 
monetized mortality benefits range from $4.5 billion to $27 bil-
lion—a stunningly wide range. And in some regulatory settings, 
benefits cannot be quantified in any helpful way, simply because 
 
 42 See Executive Order 13563 § 1(a), 3 CFR 215, 215 (“Our regulatory system . . . 
must take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Valuing Life: Humanizing the Regulatory State 36–42 (Chicago 2014) (discussing 
the decisionmaking process within government and the impact of Executive Order 13563). 
 43 See Sunstein, Valuing Life at 36–42 (cited in note 42). 
 44 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Cal L Rev 1369, 1373–85 
(2014) (examining the challenges that arise in attempts to quantify regulatory benefits). 
 45 See, for example, Peter Rogoff and Kathryn Thomson, Memorandum to Secretar-
ial Officers and Modal Administrators *1 (Department of Transportation, June 13, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2XA8-GDXN (revising the value of a statistical life for 2014 
to $9.2 million); Sunstein, Valuing Life at 94 (cited in note 42). 
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regulators lack the relevant knowledge. Here, the epistemic dif-
ficulty turns out to be formidable.46 
In the context of national security, the challenge of quantifi-
cation can be even more daunting. Suppose that the relevant 
risk is a terrorist attack. In advance, it might be exceedingly dif-
ficult to quantify the costs of such an attack. How many lives are 
at risk? Ten? Two hundred? Three thousand? More? Even if the 
number is at the low end of the scale, we have seen that any ter-
rorist attack has proliferating costs, some of them involving life 
itself.47 Of course, assessment of the expected value of precau-
tions must also engage with the question of probability: If an in-
itiative is undertaken, what is the reduction in the probability of 
a successful terrorist attack? Officials might not be able to speci-
fy the answer to that question. In this respect, the domain of na-
tional security overlaps with that of financial regulation, in 
which the identification of the benefits of regulatory safeguards 
can also be daunting.48 
There are second-order effects as well as first-order effects: 
What kinds of social consequences follow from a successful ter-
rorist attack? Do they include long-term economic costs? Do they 
include intrusions on privacy and liberty? If so, how should the-
se be counted in the risk management calculation? Should a civil 
libertarian favor national-security safeguards that appear to 
threaten civil liberties, on the ground that if they are successful, 
those very safeguards will help to preserve civil liberties against 
further intrusions? These questions might prove difficult to an-
swer when policymakers are assessing particular programs. 
B. Break-Even Analysis (and Its Discontents) 
Even if such questions do not have clear answers, officials 
may not be entirely at sea. Within the federal government, it is 
standard to speak of break-even analysis, by which officials ask: 
What would the benefits have to be for it to be worthwhile to 
 
 46 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Stud-
ies and Implications, 124 Yale L J 882, 888 (2015) (“These features [of cost-benefit analy-
sis] undermine the ability of science to precisely and reliably estimate the effects of fi-
nancial regulations, even retrospectively.”). 
 47 See generally, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer, Dread Risk, September 11, and Fa-
tal Traffic Accidents, 15 Psychological Sci 286 (2004) (finding that in the three months 
following 9/11, a rise in traffic deaths resulted in a number of traffic deaths that exceeded 
the number of plane passengers killed in the attacks, because more individuals elected to 
drive rather than fly during those months). 
 48 See Coates, 124 Yale L J at 893–95 (cited in note 46). 
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impose the costs?49 Suppose, for example, that the costs of a rule 
that would protect against some environmental risk were $200 
million but that the benefits could not be specified. We might be 
able to say that at its upper bound, the cost of the environmen-
tal damage, if it were to occur, would be $100 million. If so, the 
rule could not easily be justified.50 
Now suppose that at its upper bound, the cost of the envi-
ronmental damage would be $900 million. If so, it is not clear 
that the benefits would fail to justify the costs. An obvious ques-
tion would be: What kind of contribution would the rule have to 
make to the prevention of that damage? If the rule can be taken 
to reduce the risk by 10 percent, the costs and the benefits 
would be fairly close. Of course, the agency might not be able to 
specify any such percentage. But perhaps it is able to identify 
lower and upper bounds. If the lower bound in terms of risk re-
duction is (say) 15 percent, then the benefits do seem to justify 
the costs. 
With approaches of this kind, break-even analysis can make 
seemingly intractable problems far more tractable. Suppose, for 
example, that officials know the upper or lower bound of the 
costs associated with a risk if it comes to fruition, or suppose 
that they know the number of people or activities that might be 
affected (even if they do not know the costs of the per-person or 
per-activity impact). If so, break-even analysis might prove fea-
sible, and it might suggest that a regulation is either clearly de-
sirable or clearly a mistake. Even in standard settings, it is pos-
sible that regulators will know too little to make use of that form 
of analysis; but if they have even small pockets of knowledge, 
the approach can greatly clarify their judgments. 
At least in theory, break-even analysis can play a role in the 
context of national security as well. There are many complexi-
ties here, so let us consider a highly stylized example. Suppose 
that the cost of a terrorist attack, if it were to occur, is at least 
$200 billion, and suppose that the measure in question would 
reduce the probability of its occurrence by 10 percent. (Nothing 
turns on these particular numbers, which are introduced simply 
for purposes of analysis.) Suppose too that the measure in 
 
 49 Sunstein, Valuing Life at 65–67 (cited in note 42). 
 50 For present purposes, I am putting to one side questions about distribution and 
equity as well as questions about nonquantifiable benefits. For relevant discussions of 
these questions, see id at 127–30 (discussing distribution and equity concerns in cost-
benefit analysis); id at 58–60, 66–67 (discussing nonquantifiable benefits). 
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question would consist of security precautions at airports or cer-
tain forms of surveillance. We might ask: Is the cost of the inva-
sion of privacy in excess of $20 billion? Of course, there is no 
purely arithmetic answer to that question51—but the question 
itself might turn out to be helpful, at least if we know something 
about the nature of the risk to privacy. Advocates of the measure 
will press a legitimate question: Is it even plausible to think that 
the risk to privacy is worth more than $20 billion? 
This is of course an artificial example, and in this context, 
break-even analysis runs into particular trouble, at least if we 
indulge the reasonable assumptions that a great deal of im-
portant information is missing and that moral valuations will 
play an inescapable role. If hard-to-quantify costs are on both 
sides of the ledger––as they are in the contexts under discus-
sion––then break-even analysis becomes especially hard to un-
dertake. If so, its chief advantage is that it may promote trans-
parency about the issues involved. 
C. Avoid Gratuitous Costs 
Diverse people should be willing to converge on a simple 
principle: avoid gratuitous costs. In the environmental context, 
that seemingly self-evident principle turns out to have real bite. 
Suppose, for example, that on reflection, certain environmental 
risks turn out to be de minimis, in the sense that they are trivi-
al.52 It makes sense to say that the government should not regu-
late those risks, at least if regulation itself imposes costs. The 
principle is also important in the context of national security. 
Suppose that some forms of surveillance produce no benefits or 
only de minimis benefits. Suppose that their only function is to 
pick up information that cannot plausibly contribute to the pre-
vention of terrorist attacks. If so, there would seem to be no rea-
son that they should be continued. 
The principle does not only inform the scope of surveillance 
activities. It should also inform the design of relevant institutions. 
 
 51 I am putting to one side questions about the use of “willingness to pay” to value 
privacy issues. For a relevant discussion of this question, see id at 91–92 (explaining that 
one method of producing monetary amounts for statistical risks is to “ask people how 
much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks”). 
 52 In the easiest cases, the judgment of triviality comes from the fact that even if 
these risks come to fruition, they do not involve much harm. In harder cases, the judg-
ment of triviality comes from a calculation of expected value. If such a calculation is pos-
sible, of course, then the epistemic difficulty is not so large. 
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For example, the Review Group recommended that metadata 
should be held not by the government itself but rather by the 
phone companies, with access by the government on the basis 
of the appropriate showing of need.53 We can understand this 
recommendation as an outcome of the no-gratuitous-costs prin-
ciple. On optimistic (but not unrealistic) assumptions, it would 
deprive the government of exactly nothing that it is important 
for the government to have, while also providing a layer of pro-
tection against risks to privacy and free speech. Even if the gov-
ernment does not hold the metadata, it can obtain it on a show-
ing of need, and indeed if time requires (for example, under 
emergency conditions), it need not obtain judicial authorization 
in advance. Under these assumptions, the Review Group’s recom-
mendation flows directly from the no-gratuitous-harm principle. 
That principle is a sensible way to provide a layer of privacy 
protection without threatening national security. A much more 
controversial question still exists: Can the principle be used to 
scale back some kinds of apparent privacy protections, on the 
ground that they do no real good in terms of privacy but also 
impose some costs (in the form of national-security risks)? How-
ever uncomfortable it may be, this question deserves attention. 
D.  Avoiding Illicit Grounds 
If the purpose of surveillance is to protect national security, 
then some grounds for and uses of surveillance are automatical-
ly off-limits. They do not count in the balance at all.54 This is an 
exceedingly important idea, because it captures and takes di-
rectly on board some of the most plausible judgments behind a 
privacy precautionary principle. More specifically, it addresses 
several concerns that motivate that principle. 
The major categories are straightforward.55 Surveillance can-
not legitimately be used to punish people because of their politi-
cal views or religious convictions. Under current conditions, sur-
veillance that is designed to reduce risks to national security 
 
 53 Review Group Report at *17 (cited in note 34) (“We recommend that Congress 
should end such storage [of metadata] and transition to a system in which such meta-
data is held privately for the government to query when necessary for national security 
purposes.”). 
 54 For a discussion of “exclusionary reasons,” see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and 
Norms § 1.2 at 39–40 (Princeton 1990) (“An exclusionary reason is a second-order reason 
to refrain from acting for some reason.”). 
 55 See Review Group Report at *16 (cited in note 34) (“[S]ome safeguards are not 
subject to balancing at all.”). 
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should probably not be designed to protect against criminal ac-
tivity that raises no national-security issue.56 If the underlying 
activity involves unlawful gambling or tax evasion, there are es-
tablished routes by which the government may obtain the rele-
vant information. It is generally agreed that surveillance should 
not be designed to give a commercial advantage to American 
firms.57 In these and other respects, the interest in national se-
curity—which is what motivates surveillance in this context—
also limits and disciplines the permissible grounds for surveil-
lance. No sensible form of Cheneyism should reject those limits. 
To be sure, we could imagine more-difficult cases. Suppose, 
not implausibly, that a certain set of political views or identifia-
ble religious convictions are closely associated with a desire to 
do harm to the United States and its allies. If people are mem-
bers of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for ex-
ample, the United States is entitled to focus on them by virtue of 
that fact. But the reason involves national security, not politics 
or religion as such. We can imagine cases that might test the 
clarity of that line, but the basic principle should not be obscured. 
E. Avoid the Worst of the Worst Cases 
Decision theorists sometimes distinguish between situations 
of risk, in which probabilities can be assigned to various out-
comes, and situations of uncertainty, in which no such probabili-
ties can be assigned.58 In the domain of national security, we can 
imagine instances in which analysts cannot specify a usefully 
narrow range of probabilities and in which the extent of the 
harm from bad outcomes is also not susceptible to anything like 
precise prediction. Here again the analogy to financial regula-
tion is plausible: analysts might be able to identify only an un-
helpfully wide range of bad outcomes, and they might not be 
 
 56 To be sure, there are imaginable complexities here, such as when surveillance 
that is meant to protect against national-security risks uncovers a plan to commit acts of 
violence that do not involve national security. 
 57 See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, The Norm against Economic Espionage for the 
Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections, 83 U Chi L Rev 251 (2016) (dis-
cussing US intelligence policy’s apparent aversion to the collection of intelligence for the 
benefit of American firms). 
 58 See Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post 
Keynesian Perspective, 5 J Econ Persp 129, 130 (Winter 1991) (differentiating “true un-
certainty” from situations of probabilistic risk); Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit 233 (Houghton Mifflin 1921). 
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able to say a great deal about the contribution of a regulation to 
the prevention of such outcomes.59 
In situations of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does 
not permit regulators to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is 
sometimes suggested that rationality calls for invocation of the 
maximin principle: choose the policy with the best worst-case out-
come.60 Suppose that the worst case associated with one policy 
involves a successful terrorist attack on the United States, with 
a significant loss of lives. Suppose that the worst case associated 
with another policy involves a serious threat to privacy, in the 
form of (say) widespread official reading of private metadata (or 
more), leading to the official invasion of the private sphere. Sup-
pose finally that we cannot say much about the probability that 
one or another worst case will occur. In a case of that kind, there 
is a good argument for Cheneyism and a much weaker one for 
Snowdenism. The reason is that the worst case associated with a 
successful terrorist attack is so much worse than the worst case 
associated with a breach of personal privacy. 
To make this argument work, of course, we need to have 
thresholds of plausibility to discipline the universe of worst-case 
scenarios. We could construct a chain of causal links by which 
any bad thing leads to truly catastrophic bad things—as, for ex-
ample, when practices of the NSA are taken to produce, as a 
worst-case scenario, the end of democracy in the United States. 
But it seems reasonable to say that the threshold of plausibility 
rules that case out of bounds. 
Of course, the problem I have presented is artificial along 
multiple dimensions. We might be speaking of bounded uncer-
tainty:61 In a particular period, the probability of a successful 
terrorist attack might not be between 0 percent and 100 percent 
but rather between 0 percent and 30 percent (though we might 
not be able to say much about where it falls within that range). 
We might be able to say that if a terrorist attack occurs, very 
bad outcomes would have a cost between $X and $Y, in which $X 
 
 59 See Coates, 124 Yale L J at 894–95 (cited in note 46) (discussing some of the dif-
ficulties involved in predicting the effects of financial regulations). 
 60 For a helpful discussion, see Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case 
Study in the Philosophy of Science 185–207 (Cambridge 1983). Within decision theory, 
this is not an uncontested view. I am bracketing the complexities here. 
 61 For a discussion of “bounded uncertainty,” see Mie Augier and Kristian Kreiner, 
Rationality, Imagination and Intelligence: Some Boundaries in Human Decision-Making, 
9 Indust & Corp Change 659, 670–72 (2000) (describing how human decisionmaking is 
limited to individual knowledge and to the boundaries of what is considered possible). 
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is (say) $100 billion, and in which $Y is (say) $950 billion (these 
numbers are merely illustrative). And while the contribution of 
a particular policy might not be susceptible to precise specifica-
tion, policymakers might have an idea of a sensible range. 
Moreover, maximin is most useful in cases in which the out-
comes can easily be rendered commensurable. Suppose that a 
policymaker has two options, which would lead to different 
worst-case scenarios: (1) a loss of $500 million or (2) a loss of 
$900 million. The option that leads to the lower worst-case loss 
is better (and it is clear which is lower). Or suppose that with 
(1), the worst-case scenario involves a loss of one thousand lives, 
whereas with (2), the worst-case scenario would lose six thou-
sand lives—no ambiguity there. But the issue is more difficult 
when the outcomes are not easily commensurable. Suppose that 
a policymaker has two options, with different worst-case scenar-
ios: (1) a loss of $600 million and also 200 lives and (2) a loss of 
$900 million and also 150 lives. Are the 50 lives saved from (2) 
worth the $300 million cost? The answer depends on the value of 
a statistical life. The government now values a statistical life at 
about $9 million, so the answer is yes. 
But far harder cases are imaginable. In the context at hand, 
suppose that with one approach, the worst-case scenario is a loss 
of significant numbers of lives whereas with another, the worst-
case scenario is a massive intrusion into personal privacy. For 
progress to be made, both of these consequences would have to 
be specified. How many lives? One thousand, or five thousand, 
or forty thousand? More? And what kind of intrusion counts as 
massive? Issues of valuation cannot be avoided here. Official 
reading of (say) private metadata is far more alarming to some 
people than to others.  
On one view, which I find reasonable, a certain degree of 
vulnerability with respect to private metadata does not involve 
anything like the worst-case scenarios associated with successful 
terrorist attacks. That view might be accompanied by a judg-
ment that the risk of vulnerability with respect to private 
metadata can be sufficiently contained. But on a competing 
view, a cavalier approach to personal privacy threatens both lib-
erty and self-government themselves, and so the worst-case sce-
nario is very bad indeed (and cannot be ruled out). 
Disagreements of this kind cannot be resolved by arithme-
tic. A reference to maximin will not do the trick. Perhaps the 
best that can be done is to attempt to identify safeguards with 
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respect to privacy that plausibly reduce the risks associated 
with worst-case scenarios while also allowing officials to do what 
must be done with respect to national security. In the abstract, 
it might well seem more difficult to achieve that goal than it is 
in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
In ordinary life, people take precautions, and sensibly so; 
insurance policies are often an excellent idea. The precaution-
ary principle is animated by the reasonable idea that it is pru-
dent to act even when it is far from certain that the underlying 
danger will come to fruition. The problem is that action can 
create dangers of its own. In the environmental context, the 
precautionary principle runs into self-evident trouble when ef-
forts to reduce some environmental risks give rise to other en-
vironmental risks. But it is also problematic when those efforts 
create risks that have nothing to do with the environment. A 
wide viewscreen, rather than a narrow one, is indispensable in 
the regulatory domain. 
In the area of national security, it may be especially tempt-
ing for public officials to adopt some kind of precautionary prin-
ciple, not least because they are confronted with a dazzling ar-
ray of low-probability risks. It would be both irresponsible and 
dangerous to ignore those risks. At the same time, some precau-
tions create risks of their own, and they must be considered in 
an overall balance. Cheneyism, as I have described it here, runs 
afoul of the need for wide viewscreens. The same point certainly 
holds for those who embrace Snowdenism, which I have de-
scribed as an insistence on a precautionary principle for privacy 
and civil liberties. 
To the extent feasible, the best approach to risk manage-
ment involves cost-benefit balancing. The challenge is that in 
some domains, both costs and benefits are exceedingly hard to 
quantify, much less to monetize. The epistemic difficulty is 
severe.  
I have argued for four ideas that can help. First, despite its 
difficulties, officials should nevertheless consider the use of 
break-even analysis. Second, officials should not impose essen-
tially gratuitous costs (including risks). Third, officials should 
ensure that illicit grounds are not being invoked to intrude on 
privacy, liberty, or anything else. Fourth, officials should take 
steps to prevent the worst of the worst-case scenarios. There are 
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no algorithms here, but a form of risk management, embodying 
these ideas, can help to avoid some of the pathologies of both 
Cheneyism and Snowdenism: precautionary principles of the 
most blinkered or myopic sorts. 
